Specific Performance--Foreclosure of Land-Purchase Contract--Where Time is of the Essence by Burk, Robert W.
Volume 40 Issue 3 Article 16 
April 1934 
Specific Performance--Foreclosure of Land-Purchase Contract--
Where Time is of the Essence 
Robert W. Burk 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert W. Burk, Specific Performance--Foreclosure of Land-Purchase Contract--Where Time is of the 
Essence, 40 W. Va. L. Rev. (1934). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss3/16 
This Recent Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
gage is substituted in ignorance of an intervening lien, the mort-
gage released through mistake may be restored in equity and given
its original priority as a lien.' A court of equity will grant re-
lief on the ground of mistake, not only when the mistake is ex-
pressly proved, but also when it is implied from the nature of the
transaction.' However, the courts seem to make a distinction in
the cases where the reinstatement will work a hardship on inno-
cent third parties," or where the intervener is a bona fide pur-
chaser for value without notice' or where the first mortgagee had
actual notice of the subsequent lien or mortgage;' and in these
instances, refuse to grant reinstatement. The court in the earlier
case of Atkinson v. Plum' had employed the theory of actual notice
fo refuse reinstatement, saying that the first mortgagee showed an
intention to waive his prior lien when he released with actual
notice.' It is submitted that while this is the first decision in West
Virginia on the point, the court has correctly followed the weight
of authority."
-MORRIS S. FUNT.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - FORECLOSURE OF LAND-PURCHASE
CONTRACT - WnERE Timi IS OF THE ESSENCE. - Plaintiff vendee
had entered into possession under a land-purchase contract, but
title was not to be delivered until a certain part of the considera-
tion was paid. The contract provided that in case of vendee's
0 Stnpson v. Pease, and Greib v. Reynolds, both supra n. 4; Linn v. Linn,
122 Mich. 130, 80 N. W. 1000 (1899); Liggett v. Himle, 38 Minn. 421, 38
N. W. 201 (1888); Bruce v. Bonney, 12 Gray (Mass.) 107, 71 Am. Dec. 739
(1858).
'Security Trust Co. v. Martin, 178 Ark. 518, 12 S. W. (2d) 879 (1928);
Wells v. Huffman, 69 Ind. App. 379, 121 N. B. 840 (1919); Williams v.
Libby, 118 Me. 80, 105 Atl. 855 (1919) ; Downing v. Hill, 165 Mich. 559, 130
N. W. 1115 (1911).
' Deleski v. Peters Trust Co., 115 Neb. 574, 213 N. W. 829 (1927) ; Cherry
v. Welsher, 196 Iowa 640, 192 N. W. 149 (1923).
OLomas & Nettleton v. Isaacs, 101 Conn. 614, 127 AtI. 6 (1924) (construc-
tive notice, i. e., recordation, is not enough); Atkinson v. Plum, 50 W. Va.
104, 40 S. E. 587, 58 L. R. A. 788 (1901) (The court draws a clear distinc-
tion between' the principle case and this one on basis of notice); Nommen-
son v. Angle, supra n. 4. (The courts grant reinstatement where constructive
notice existed on the theory of mistake of fact, i. e. mistake as to the conse-
quences of the release and that under modern recording statutes the first
mortgagee is not bound to look beyond his own lien which was prior).
-B Supra n. 8.
"Per Brannon, J., "Intention is the pole star in the matter."
See PomERoY, 7oc. cit. &upra n. 3 and JONES, Zoc. cit. supra n. 3. See also
for a recent decision reaching a similar result, Federal Union Life Insurance
Co. v. Deitsch, 127 Oh. St. 505, 189 N. E. 440 (1934).
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failure to pay the instalments in the specified time, defendant
vendor by giving written notice could declare the agreement null
and void, and could also retain the payments made theretofore as
rental. Plaintiff defaulted and was dispossessed by an action of
unlawful entry and detainer. He then filed a suit in the circuit
court, seeking specific performance and an accounting of the con-
tract. On conflicting evidence, the circuit court found that at
the date of the notice plaintiff was behind on his payments and,
pursuant to the prayer of defendant's answer, forfeited the con-
tract. From this decree, plaintiff appealed. Held: The lower
court should have given the vendee a day in which to pay the
balance, and, in case of default thereafter, decreed a sale of the
property to foreclose his equity therein. Reversed and remanded.
McCartney 'v. Campbe U.1
Time is usually of the essence in an option, both at law' and
in equity. There must be an acceptance within the specified time
by tender of payment' or by notice,' depending upon the partic-
ular offer. In either case, however, there may be a waiver of
strict performance,' or, if the proposal is unsealed and without
consideration, it is revocable at any time regardless of the stipula-
tion.r
In contracts for the sale of land, time is not ordinarily of
the essences unless made so by stipulation of the parties.' Accord-
'171 S. E. 821 (W. Va. 1933).
I John v. Elkins, 63 W. Va. 158, 59 S. E. 961 (1907).
""At one time it was the equitable doctrine that the parties could iot
make time so material as to become of the essence of the contract, but
long ago this doctrine was abrogated, and it is now well established that this
can be done. The optionor, by the express language of the option made
time of the essence ..... .The offer ceased when not accepted within the
stated time .... It was nothing but a proposition of sale upon one side,
with the privilege of acceptance upon the other. And, .... it was essential
that it be accepted before the right to do so had expired by lapse of time."
Pollock v. Brookover, 60 W. Va. 75, 83, 53 S. E. 795, 798 (1906).Let . if an option is .... to be accepted by payment within a given
time, then the time of payment is certainly essential; in fact .... a con-
dition precedent to the vesting of any right in the vendee." Watson v.
Coast, 35 W. Va. 463, 474, 14 S. E. 249, 252 (1891).
'Casto v. Cook, 91 W. Va. 209, 112 S. E. 502 (1922).
'West Virginia Power and Transmission Co. v. Mary E. Voight at aL, 91
W. Va. 581, 114 S. E. 138 (1922).
"Corbin, Option Contracts (1914) 23 YAE L. J. 641.
8 Contract not void for uncertainty where time not expressed. Broemsen
et al. v. Agnic, 70 W. Va. 106, 73 S. E. 253 (1911).
'Whether time is essential depends on intent of parties. 4 PoMERoY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDFNcE (4th ed. 1919) § 1407. Collins v. Thomas ot ei., 87
W. Va. 597, 105 S. E. 897 (1921). But there may be waiver of time by
subsequent agreement, Pyle v. Henderson; 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. E. 762 (1908);
or acts in pais, Colburn v. Keyser, 96 W. Va. 507, 123 S. E. 430 (1924).
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ing to the authorities,"'it would seem that time was thus of the
essence in the instant case. If the element of time be made a con-
dition precedent," strict adherence is usually required.' But even
so, the right of a delinquent vendee to specific performance will
depend largely upon whether the performance is to be that of
an affirmative act,' or of mere payment of money, the delay in
which may be compensated by damages, ' - whether the vendee
has entered into possession of the land under the contract of sale,"
- and, especially, whether the extent of the performance" is of
such a degree that forfeiture or severe detriment will result from
an adverse decree.'
Equity reluctantly enforces forfeiture? but readily relieves
from them.' This is particularly true where the forfeiture is in
10Time may become of the essence by the insertion of provisions clearly
contemplating such precise performance, - such, for example, as a forfeiture
clause and one rendering contract null and void upon default in payments.
Marshall v. Porter, 73 W. Va. 258, 80 S. E. 350 (1913); 4 PomERoY, op. cit.
sutra n. 9, at § 1408 note 3.
" Condition precedent as used here means that performance must be within
specified time or no right vests. Adams et al. v. Guyandotte Valley Ry. Co.,
64 W. Va. 181, 61 S. E. 341 (1908).
3 2Thompson v. Robinson, 65 W. Va. 506, 64, S. E. 718 (1908). 1 PooY,
op. cit. supra note 9, § 455.
"In Adams et al. v. Guyandotte Valley Ry. Co., supra n. 11, the court
distinguishes between the element of time regarding an act, such as building
a railroad, and mere payment of money.
"1Where time admits of compensation, as it always does where lapse
arises from failure to pay money at particular day, it is not essential.
Abbott v. L'Hommedieu, 10 W. Va. 677 (1877). Interest will be sufficient
compensation. Wheeling Creek Gas, Coal & Coke Co. v. Elder, 54 W. Va.
335, 46 S. E. 357 (1903).
'As to granting specific performance to vendee in default - "This is
especially true when the vendee has been put in possession under the con-
tract. In such case, time of payment is rarely, if ever, regarded as material."
Liskey v. Snyder, 56 W. Va. 610, 620, 49 S. E. 515, 519 (1904).
"If nothing has been paid, possession neither parted with nor acquired,
nothing is involved except mere value of bargain and the time will be en-
forced strictly. If large payments and substantial performance, time is less
material. West Virginia Power and Transmission Co. v. Mary E. Voight
et al., supra n. 6; Henry v. Dudley, 91 W. Va. 696, 114 S. E. 286 (1922).
No cases were found attempting to state limit to which performance must
be made. All say that it lies within the discretion of the court.
"Huldll v. Meyers et al., 36 W. Va. 639, 15 S. E. 151 (1891) ; Pound, The
Progress Of The Law, Equity (1919) 33 HARv. L. REv. 929, 951.
s Affirmative relief against penalties and forfeitures was one of the springs
or foundations of equity jurisdiction; and it would be going in the very
opposite direction, and acting contrary to its essential principles affirm-
atively to enforce a forfeiture. Craig v. Hukll, 37 W. Va. 520, 523, 16 S. E.
363, 364 (1892); Dutterer et al. v. Logan et al, 103 W. Va. 216, 137 S. E.
1 (1927).
"1I POEROY, op. cit. supra n. 9, § 450. In W. Va., a prominent field
for equitable relief from forfeitures is in oil and gas, and coal leases. Beech
Fork Coal Co. v. Pocahontas Corp., 109 W. Va. 39, 152 S. B. 785 (1930);
Engel et al. v. Eastern Oil Co. et al., 100 W. Va. 301, 130 S. E. 491 (1925).
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the nature of penalty," or where payments are forfeited for de-
fault in the performance of a pecuniary covenant.' However, in
seeking such relief, the vendee musi be free from negligence and
design, and the duration of the delay must not have been sufficient
to permit a material change in the value of the property.'
In relieving from the forfeiture, the principal case has merely
reiterated the precedents.' Yet if it be construed as holding that,
in event of default by vendee as to payment of the balance, his
equity must always be foreclosed by a sale, the decision goes a
step farther than the earlier precedents.2 ' Such a methods of fore-
closure is already employed in the enforcement of vendor's liense
and common law mortgages, in both of which the rights of the
parties are analogous to those under land-purchase contracts.'
This relief is the more striking, since time had here been made of
the essence. In effect, the court is treating the executory contract
as though in equity it were executed in fact, the vendee being
given a day in which to redeem the premises.' By the decree, the
.Givens et al. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 84 W. Va. 301, 99 S. E. 476 (1919).
3 STORY, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) § 1732. Mere acceleration
clauses will be enforced. Burlew v. Smith et al., 68 W. Va. 458, 69 S. E. 908(1910).
'Wheeling & Elm Grove R. R. Co. v. Town of Triadelphia, ot al, 58 W.
Va. 487, 52 S. E. 499 (1905).
'Westerman et al. v. Dinsmore et a., 68 W. Va. 594, 71 S. E. 250 (1911).
In Wheeling & Elm Grove R. R. Co. v. Town of Triadelphia, et al., supra
n. 21, at 519, the court decreed specific performance saying, . ......
there must be full performance of the covenant as a condition of relief ....
We do not take away either the right to have the delinquency made good or
the power to forfeit for future delinquencies."
IBut of. Watzman v. Unatin, 101 W. Va. 41, 131 S. E. 874 (1926), where
parties had provided for re-entry and had enforced it themselves, the court
of equity would not relieve.
"Where vendee is in default and refuses to go on he cannot recover on
the contract at law, Stewart v. Elkins, 101 W. Va. 557, 138 S. B. 125 (1926).
Or when he sues for specific performance under such conditions, he is usually
required to tender the purchase price, Liskey v. Snyder, supra n. 15.
Vendee, not in default, was permitted to have lien on land for amount paid,
Bryan v. Lofftus's Adm'rs, I Rob. '(Va.) 12 (1842). In Clarke, et al. v. Cur-
tis, 11 Leigh (Va.) 559 (1841), a proceeding by vendor for specific per-
formance of the contract after defendant had defaulted in paying purchase
price, it was held proper to decree sale of property covered by the contract,
unless the vendee within a reasonable time, designated by the court, pay the
amount fixed by the decree; the surplus to be paid to the vendee.
5 Miller v. Hawker, 85 W. Va. 691, 102 S. E. 470 (1920). A similar fore-
closure decreed in suit by vendor for specific performance, where the vendee
was in possession. Hempfield R. R. Co. v. Thornburg, I W. Va. 267 (1866).
'Abney-Barnes Co. et al. v. Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co. et a13., 83 W. Va.
292, 98 S. E. 298 (1919).
25 POMEROY, op. cit. supra n. 9, § 2238.
'Under a similar situation in Abbott v. L'Hommedieu, supra n. 14,
713, it is said that the ownership of the land vests in the vendee and that of
the purchase price in the vendor, so that the right thus acquired will not be
forfeited by a failure to execute a conveyance or pay the price at the ap-
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vendee is afforded relief, while the vendor is placed in much the
same position as if he were suing on his implied lin." A sound
decision has been reached in this litigation, achieving a result
that challenges current theory as to the decadence of equity.'
-ROBERT W. BuRm
T.Ax&TION - CONsT moUNoAL LAW - DUE PRocESs op LAW
AS PRESCRIBING MAxIrUM LIMITS FOR DMECT PROPERTY TAXES. -
The town of Carolina Beach, having defaulted in payment of
principal and interest of bonds issued for certain public im-
provements, the holder thereof obtained judgment and after-
wards a writ of mandamus requiring the town to levy a tax upon
real and personal property sufficient to pay the total amount of
the bonds and the costs of the suit. Plaintiff, a hotel company,
sues to restrain the collection of the tax "on the ground that such
tax is exorbitant and confiscatory." The writ of mandamus
necessitated an increase in the tax levy from one dollar to three
dollars, per hundred, over a period of three years. Held: The
judgment against the town was binding on the inhabitants:
dictum, that plaintiff was not deprived of its property without due
process of law. Pate Hotel Company v. Morris.'
As to procedural objections, it is the recognized rule that
a judgment or decree against a municipality imposes an obliga-
tion upon its citizens which they are compelled to discharge, ex-
pointed time. And, that the chancellor treats the contract as executed in fact
though it is executory in form.
"Fisher v. Brown, 24 W. Va. 713 (1884); King v. Burdett et al., 44 W.
Va. 561, 29 S. E. 1010 (1898). It is said in MeNeely v. S. P. Oil Co. et al.,
52 W. Va. 616, 44 S. E. 508 (1902) the vendors only remedy against vendee
would be to specifically execute the contract, have balance due decreed, and in
default of payment after a day given therefore, a decree to sell and have
vendee's equity foreclosed. In Liskey v. Snyder, supra n. 15, at 528,
it is said that vendor has option to cause the lands to be sold and the
proceeds thus disposed of, or to rescind the contract for failure of the vendee
to comply with his part. But, even so, the former of these would be his best
remedy, for equity would relieve from a forfeiture of vendee's payments in
case of a rescission.
The implied lien, where vendor retains the title, is not affected by the
statute abolishing implied liens in conveyances. See reviser's note to c. 38,
art. 1, § 1, W. VA. CoDE (1931). Poe v. Paxton, 26 W. Va. 607, 610 (1885).
m Pound, The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 COL. L. REv. 20.
1 171 S. E. 799 (N. C. 1933).
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